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OPTING FOR CHANGE OR CONTINUITY? THINKING
ABOUT 'REFORMING' THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE OF
MONTANA'S CONSTITUTION
Andrew P. Morriss*

Although Montanans rejected the proposed Constitutional Convention
in the November 2010 election, the issues raised by the debate remain. As
Montanans consider whether to revisit their state Constitution through initiative, referenda, or legislative action, they have the opportunity to reconsider the structure of their judiciary. This opportunity is important because
state judiciaries play an increasingly significant role in American government for multiple reasons. Some state high courts have taken up former
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan's call for state constitutional jurisprudence to advance civil liberties.' As state administrative
agencies wrestle with increasingly difficult regulatory issues, state courts
2
have become important players in an expanding regulatory environment.
In areas as diverse as public-education finance and takings, state courts
have assumed leading policy roles.3 As a result, Robert Williams' authoritative analysis of state constitutions concludes: "[Sitate courts in many jurisdictions have developed into major policy-making branches of state government.''4 Judicial climates affect business location decisions and thus the
* D. Paul Jones, Jr. & Charlene A. Jones Chairholder in Law & Professor of Business, University
of Alabama. A.B. Princeton (1981); J.D., M.Pub.Aff. University of Texas at Austin (1984); Ph.D. (Economics) M.I.T. (1994). Thanks to Robert Natelson for sparking my initial interest in Montana jurisprudence and his generous help to a then-new law professor who turned up with many questions after
reading one of his articles. I would also like to thank the Property & Environment Research Center for
enabling many visits to the State, the editors of the Montana Law Review, past and present, for their
assistance with this and previous publications, and to Roger Meiners for comments.
1.William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489 (1977). See also Clint Bolick, Brennan's Epiphany: The Necessity of Invoking State Constitutions to Protect Freedom, 12 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 137 (2007) (arguing for Brennan's approach). Not all
courts have accepted Brennan's invitation. See Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial
Federalism and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure,45 Ohio St. L.J. 143 (1985) (criticizing
the Ohio Supreme Court for its failure to develop state constitutional jurisprudence).
2. See Laura Langer, Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study (SUNY
Press 2002); Scott Graves & Paul Teske, State Supreme Courts and Judicial Review of Regulation, 66
Albany L. Rev. 857 (2003).
3. See Matthew H. Bosworth, Courts as Catalysts: State Supreme Courts and Public School Finance Equity (SUNY Press 2001); Michael Heise, Adequacy Litigation in an Era of Accountability, in
School Money Trials: The Legal Pursuit OfEducationalAdequacy (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson,
eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2007); Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hatheock,
Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1005 (2004).
4. Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions283 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
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overall health of state economies. 5 Even where state courts are not directly
driving policy, they are important checks on state legislatures and executive
branch agencies. Montanans need to consider to what extent they wish their
state judiciary to exercise this role and how they wish to choose and control
the individuals who exercise this power.
If Montanans revisit their Constitution in the future, and the process
results in changes to the Judiciary Article, it will not be the first time Montana has experienced significant change in its judiciary. Since its formation
out of the Idaho Territory in 1864, Montana has operated under three sets of
judicial institutions. From its organization until statehood, the Montana
Territory had a judicial branch established by Congress and filled with circuit-riding judges who often sat both as appellate and trial judges, appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the President. 6 From statehood in
1889 to the adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the State of Montana had
quite a different set of judicial institutions, with judges elected by the
State's population to fixed terms of six years and a separation between the
State's supreme and trial courts.7 The 1972 Constitution modified the details of the 1889 Constitution's judicial provisions, extending terms and incorporating some features of the merit-selection system, giving Montana its
third form of judicial institutions. 8 Is it time for further changes?
As a non-resident (although a frequent visitor, with great affection for
the state), I cannot answer that question. This paper attempts to provide a
framework for analysis that Montanans can use in assessing whether or not
their constitutional provisions regarding the judiciary require revision. 9
Since the 1972 Convention, legal and social-scientific analyses of courts
and judges have advanced. These studies provide insights unavailable to
those drafting the earlier constitutions.
On the other hand, Montana's legal history provides reasons to think
carefully about being too hasty to restructure the state government. Within
a few years of its organization as a territory, Montana's statutes developed
5. See e.g. Lawrence J. McQuillan & Hovannes Abramyan, U.S. Tort Liability Index: 2010 Report
(P. Research Inst. 2010).
6. The Organic Act, 13 Stat. 85, ch. 95, § 9 (May 26, 1864).
7. Mont. Const. art. VIII (1889) (superseded 1972 by Mont. Const. art. VIII). Montanans also
drafted constitutions in 1866 and 1884; the former was lost before it could be ratified and, while the
latter was ratified, it was never accepted by Congress and so never took effect. See Larry M. Elison &
Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution:A Reference Guide (Greenwood Press 2001). Elections
were originally partisan; there was a brief experience with non-partisan elections in 1909-1911; partisan
elections returned until abolished in 1935.
8. Mont. Const. art. VII.
9. In doing so, I am avoiding both the length and comprehensive footnotes common to law-review
articles, as I believe few non-academics could be troubled to read a lengthy, heavily footnoted treatise.
The sources cited provide excellent guides to the relevant literatures and include many references for
those interested in reading further.
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into a confusing jumble due to the abrogation of the Second and Third Territorial Legislature's work by a ham-handed and partisan Congress and to a
botched 1869-1871 effort at compiling the session laws into a single volume. 10 One result of the ensuing legal confusion was the 1895 adoption of
a massive legal reform-784,000 words and 170 pounds of laws' '-which
dramatically changed the new state government and the body of Montana
law in a variety of ways, including some that few involved in the process
seemed to have anticipated.' 2 If nothing else, the State's experience with
the radical reforms of 1895 ought to warn of the potential perils of wholesale "reform" efforts in which the volume of changes swamps the ability of
13
institutions to carefully consider the details.
The 1972 Convention suggests another way in which well-intentioned
reform processes do not always work out as planned. The 1889 Constitution prohibited legislators from being "appointed to any civil office under
the state" during their terms. 14 In 1971, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted this as a bar to participation in the convention; thus, the 1972 Convention excluded then-current legislative officeholders. 15 One need not be
cynical to conclude the members of the 1971 Legislature probably did not
anticipate such an outcome.' 6 Before deciding to launch any future convention process, Montanans might consider who is likely to be writing any new
constitution and whether such a conclave would deliver in practice those
improvements available in theory.
In particular, Montanans may wish to consider the degree to which
partisan politics might play a role in a future convention, particularly with
respect to the judiciary. Since judges and courts are still areas where most
Americans at least pay lip service to the goal of minimizing politics, it is
worth considering whether a convention or other method would risk further
politicization of the judicial branch.
Again, the 1972 Convention offers a cautionary example. The exclusion of sitting legislators from the Convention by the Montana Supreme
Court's ruling was expected to reduce the role of politics in the 1972 Convention's deliberations. Certainly the 1972 Convention's leadership saw
10. Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws": Lessons from One Hundred
Years of Codification in Montana, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 359, 379-380 (1995).
11. Id. at 360.
12. Id. at 397-402. To take just one example, this "reform" process led to problematic results in
real-property law as former University of Montana law professor Robert Natelson noted in 1990. Robert
G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 17 (1990).
13. Morriss, supra n.10, at 445-446.
14. Legis. Assembly v. Lennon, 481 P.2d 330 (Mont. 1971).
15. Id.
16. Nor need one have a negative view of politicians' ambitions to conclude that it would be even
more surprising if today's state political leadership made the same "mistake" and failed to find a means
to provide for their own participation in any convention convened to rewrite the state Constitution.
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the deliberations as less partisan as a result of the exclusion; in his preface
to the official record of the proceedings, Convention Chairman Leo
Graybill, Jr. wrote:
The delegates brought none of the acrimony and bitterness to the Convention
that sometimes develops between seasoned politicians with preconceived positions on major state issues. Thus the delegates were able to approach the
principal issues before the Convention in an objective manner, and they also
avoided a good deal of the pressures to which legislators are subjected. The
probable unforeseen result of the Supreme Court's action was a constitutional
body relatively free from influence and dedicated to basic changes in Montana's constitutional framework.t7

With "all of the major, active politicians serving in the Legislature" being
"frozen out" of the Convention and without current officeholders' ambitions clouding the picture, Chairman Graybill contended:
The delegates seemed unconsciously to apply an overriding democratic principle to their deliberations. They asked themselves, "Does it fit the future?
Can it work in the future? How will the future generations respond?" Their
concern for a time far beyond the present seems to me to be a rare and re8
markable trait.1

While the Convention as a whole may have succeeded in setting aside
partisanship, this was not the case with respect to consideration of the Judiciary Article. The Judiciary Committee made its recommendations on a
series of 5-4 near-party-line votes.' 9 Party identification even trumped the
divide between lawyers and non-lawyers on the Committee. 20 Such divisions may have been coincidental, but the votes suggest that politics were
not quite as far removed from the Convention as Chairman Graybill suggested.
This fact does not mean that constitutional revision is necessarily a bad
idea. Montana's Constitution is the product of the time in which it was
drafted, and, like the sartorial fashions of the time, some of the legal fash17. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedingsvol. 1, i (Mont. Legis. & Legis. Council 1972)
(available at http://courts.mt.gov/library/montanajlaws.mcpx).
18. Id. at vol. 1, i, iii.
19. The Judiciary Committee consisted of David L. Holland, Chair (D); Catherine Pemberton, Vice
Chair (R); J. Mason Melvin (D); Leslie "Joe" Eskildsen (D); Rod Hanson (D); Cedor B. Aronow (D);
John M. Schiltz (D); Jean M. Bowman (R); and Ben E. Berg, Jr. (R). Convention biographies appear in
Montana ConstitutionalConvention Proceedings,supra n. 17, at vol. 1, 31-64; committee assignments
are listed at vol. 1, 22-23. Judiciary Committee votes are listed at vol. 1, 537-543. The only delegate
to cross party lines was J. Mason Melvin, a Democrat from Gallatin County, who consistently voted
with the Republican minority on the Committee. Melvin's background as a county sheriff and former
FBI agent suggests he may have been a relatively conservative Democrat. Id. at vol. 1, 53.
20. Four members of the Judiciary Committee were lawyers (Holland, Aronow, Schiltz, and Berg).
Id. at vol. I, 31-64. Three of these were Democrats and one a Republican. Id. There were no recorded
votes in which the Republican lawyer joined the Democratic lawyers in backing a proposal before the
Committee, nor were there instances of either Democratic or Republican non-lawyers siding with one
another against the lawyers. Id. at 537-543.
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ions of the late 1960s and early 1970s have not held up well in subsequent
decades. Moreover, the subsequent growth of fields such as public-choice
theory makes for a more transparent understanding of constitutional choices
about topics ranging from voting rules to jurisdiction.2 1 Montanans may
thus decide that the need to revise the state Constitution trumps concerns
about where such efforts may lead. If they do, how might a debate over the
shape of the judiciary be structured?
Conceptually, there are four important groups of issues surrounding
the constitutional provisions necessary to establish a state judiciary:
" Structure of the court system, including the number and type of courts
established and the role of alternative methods of dispute resolution;
" Selection of judicial officers, including their requisite qualifications;
" Constraints on judicial action; and
" Removal of judicial officers.

This paper briefly considers each, summarizing the issues involved, and
framing the questions Montanans will need to consider if they opt to revisit
their Constitution.
Why listen to an outsider on questions about how Montanans should
structure their judiciary? I offer two perspectives that might be useful.
First, I have studied and written about Montana's nineteenth-century legal
history at least as much as any non-Montanan. 22 That history remains relevant to the State's legal future because Montana law still incorporates a
great deal of the legislation created then; even the State's legal symbols
include references to key events in that history. 2 3 Second, as an economist
in the public-choice school who has conducted empirical research on courts,
24
I can apply the insights of that theory and research.
21. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge U. Press 2003) (summarizing literature).
22. Morriss, supra n. 10; Andrew P. Morriss, Legal Argument in the Opinions of Montana Territorial Chief Justice Decius S. Wade, 1 Nev. L. Rev. 38 (2001); Scott J. Burnham, Andrew P. Morriss, &
James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 371 (2000); Andrew
P. Morriss, Decius S. Wade's "The Necessity for Codification", 61 Mont. L. Rev. 407 (2000); Andrew
P. Morriss, Decius Wade's "The Common Law", 59 Mont. L. Rev. 225 (1998); Andrew P. Morriss,
PrivateActors & StructuralBalance: Militia & the Free Rider Problem in PrivateProvision of Law, 58
Mont. L. Rev. 115 (1997); Andrew P. Morriss, How Montana Employers Got Rid of the Employment-AtWill Rule, vol. 34, No. 3 (ABA Sec. Lab. & Empl. Law) (Spring 2006); Andrew P. Morriss, The Story of
the Montana Wrongful Dischargefrom Employment Act: A Drama in 5 Acts, in Employment Law Stories (Sam Estreicher & Gillian Lester, eds., Found. Press 2006) [hereinafter The Story of the WDEA].
23. See Morriss, Private Actors & Structural Balance, supra n. 22, at 115-116 (on symbolism,
including the Montana Highway Patrol's use of "3-7-77" and statues at the state capitol).
24. Morriss, The Story of the WDEA, supra n. 22; Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise, & Gregory
C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 63 (2005);
Andrew P. Morriss, Comment: A Public Choice Perspective on the Federal Circuit, 54 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 811 (2004); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Searchingfor the Soul of
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 491
(2004); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377 (1998).
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I. STRUCTURE

How should Montana's judicial branch be structured? While there is a
virtually infinite number of possible variations, there are five major differences in the ways American states have structured their judiciaries through
their constitutions: (1) how much structure to put in the constitution and
how much to leave to legislative discretion; (2) how much to compensate
judges; (3) whether or not to have an intermediate court of appeals in addition to a supreme court; (4) whether or not to have specialized courts; and
(5) the role of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") methods, such as mediation and arbitration, in the court system.
A.

ConstitutionalizingStructure

Among the first questions a judiciary article of the Montana Constitution must address is the extent to which the state Constitution ought to determine the details of the structure of the state court system. The federal
Constitution provides for the authority and scope of the federal judiciary but
25
is not self-executing, leaving the details of the court system to Congress.
The Montana Constitution includes some details regarding the current structure of Montana courts (e.g. term length); 26 other details are left to the Legislature (e.g. numbers and locations of district courts). 27 To what extent
should a state constitution spell out the number, levels, salaries, and so forth
of the state judiciary?
Including structural details in a constitution makes future change more
costly, since amending a constitution requires more steps and a larger majority (depending on the provisions for amendment) than amending a statute. The only reason to put the structural details of the courts into the state
constitution is to make it harder for future legislators, who could be in a fit
over a particular court ruling, to alter the structure of the courts and meddle
in their operation. The temptation for a legislature to interfere is significant. Consider Professor Charles Geyh's description of the successful efforts by the legislative and executive branches to interfere with the federal
courts' independence:
[A]t the turn of the Nineteenth century, Congress packed and unpacked the
lower courts for partisan ends in the "Midnight Judges" affair, and impeached
judges for their strident, pro-Federalist sympathies; a generation later, Georgia defied the Supreme Court altogether, and President Andrew Jackson declared that he had the constitutional authority to do likewise; during Reconstruction, a radical Republican Congress stripped the Court of jurisdiction to
25. U.S. Const. art. 1I.
26. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 7.
27. Id. at art. Vn, § 6.

2011

REFORMING MONTANA'S JUDICIAL ARTICLE

undo an important piece of Reconstruction legislation, and, the story goes,
packed and unpacked the Supreme Court for political purposes. During the
populist and progressive period, proposals to curb or eliminate judicial review
and end life tenure abounded, culminating in a successful effort by Franklin
Delano Roosevelt to intimidate the Supreme Court into changing its pattern of
decisionmaking [sic] by proposing to pack the Court with New Deal sympathizers. And a generation later, Richard Nixon campaigned to end Warren
Court liberalism in the wake of calls to impeach Earl Warren and William 0.
Douglas, and did so by replacing retiring justices with avowedly more con2 8
servative successors.

Despite this impressive record of meddling, Geyh concludes that at the
federal level, the political branches' ability to interfere with the courts

outside of the appointments process has diminished, concentrating politicians' interest on appointments.2 9 Both Richard Epstein and Richard Posner have reached similar conclusions, finding the structure of the federal
judiciary has effectively insulated it from most political pressures, at least
in the modem era. 30 My coauthors and I reached a similar conclusion when
we examined specific patterns of decisions by federal district judges in lim31
ited areas.

Nonetheless, we might draw from this history the lesson that, when
possible, the political branches will endeavor to restrict courts' independence. It may be that an independent judiciary is a good thing overall for
self-interested politicians, 32 but at any particular moment, politicians may
not see their general interest as trumping the benefits of meddling. Constitutional safeguards of judicial independence are thus important to retain.
The primary means of doing so is to provide judges with guaranteed compensation and a sufficiently long term.
With respect to the number, location, and size of courts, there is little
reason to restrict the abilities of future legislatures. These are primarily
administrative matters that changes in Montana's population and economy

may or may not make necessary, and preserving legislative flexibility is
likely the best course.

28. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in CongressionalRegulation of Courts, 78 Ind. L.J. 153, 157 (2003).
29. Id. at 159.
30. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 827 (1990); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993).
31. Sisk, Heise, & Morriss, Charting the Influences on the JudicialMind, supra n. 24.
32. See William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J. of L. & Econ. 875 (1975).
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Compensation

Judicial salaries are a structural detail that merits consideration in a
state constitution. One of the longest-running themes in the literature on
judges is the persistent complaint that they are underpaid. Although judicial salaries at both the state and federal levels compare favorably with
average salaries in many professions, they compare poorly to the salaries
partners make at elite law firms. Moreover, legislatures at the federal and
state levels are often reluctant to grant judges salary increases that keep
pace with inflation, preferring to allow judicial salaries to erode until they
can be used as an excuse to raise the legislators' own salaries as well. 33 For
example, nationally, state-supreme-court-chief judges' salaries rose by only
a total of 2.75% from 2003 to 2009, compared to Social Security's Cost-ofLiving-Adjustments of 2.1%, 2.7%, 4.1%, 3.3%, 2.3%, and 5.8% during
that period. 34 Establishing a constitutionally mandated formula for pay increases would eliminate this temptation and help ensure that Montana's
judges continue to be paid at a level necessary to attract interest in judgeships by qualified lawyers.
Montana law currently sets judicial salaries based on the average salary of judges in North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Idaho. 35 This
practice has resulted in judicial salaries ($115,160, $113,964, and $106,870
for the Montana Supreme Court Chief Justice, associate justices, and trial
court judges, respectively) 3 6 well below the national medians ($152,495,
$145,984, and $130,312 respectively), 37 placing Montana fiftieth in terms
of judicial compensation in 2009.38 Of course, Montana is not New York,
and it would be unreasonable to expect the level of state judicial salaries to
be as high as in places with extraordinary costs of living. However, tying
judicial salaries to the average of other relatively low-paying states would
appear to be a poor way to attract the State's best legal talent to the courts.
Allowing for judicial salaries to increase each year based on an increase in an objective formula (e.g. the Consumer Price Index or the rate of
33. For a brief overview of the perennial federal judicial salary crises, see Blake Denton, The
FederalJudicial Salary Crisis, 2 Drexel L. Rev. 152 (2009). For an example of the problem of linkage
at the state level, see Daniel G. De Pasquale, Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, First
Department, 26 Touro L. Rev. 759 (2010).
34. Soc. Sec. Admin., Cost-of-Living Adjustments, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/colaseries.
html (last accessed October 6, 2010).
35. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2-16-403, 3-5-211 (2009).
36. Natl. Ctr. for St. Cts., Judicial Salary Resource Center: Region: West-State: Montana, http://
www.ncsconline.org/DKIS/Salary-Survey/state-inc.asp?STATE=MT (last accessed October 6, 2010).
37. Nat]. Ctr. for St. Cts., Survey of Judicial Salaries, Vol. 34, No. 2, http://contentdm.ncsconline.
org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/judicial&CISOPTR=288 (last accessed June 30, 2009).
38. Id. at 2. It appears that Montana judges should get a raise in 2010 under the current formula, as
all the states used to benchmark Montana judge salaries pay their judges more generously.
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increase in Social Security payments), unless a super-majority of the Montana Legislature voted to suspend the increase (thus allowing for fiscal
emergencies), would largely remove the issue from day-to-day politics. Increasing judicial salaries is hardly likely to make a revised Judiciary Article
a reason for voters to support a new constitution or amendment; nonetheless, whatever the level of judicial salaries, Montana ought to protect the
independence of its state judiciary by properly indexing judges' salaries to
the cost of living and protecting the formula by placing it in the state Constitution.

39

C. Intermediate Courts of Appeal
Robert Williams has noted: "One of the most important innovations in
state court structure in the twentieth century is the advent of intermediate
appeals courts."'40 Professor Charles Geyh summarized the impact of this
development:
Armed with the discretion to set their own agendas, supreme courts have increasingly allowed the intermediate courts of appeals to have the final word in
garden-variety disputes where appellate review is limited to correcting trial
court errors, and confined their dockets to more controversial cases in which
the law is unclear and their primary mission is to "say what the law is." The
net effect has been to highlight the policy-making role that state supreme
courts play when filling gaps in constitutional and statutory law and making
41
common law.

Thirty-nine states have such courts; the remainder do not. Should Montana?
Intermediate courts of appeals purport to offer three main advantages. 42 First, they relieve the burden on the state supreme court, allowing
that court to shift appeals off its calendar and focus its resources on more
39. The National Center for State Courts reviewed New York's judicial salary structure and recommended: "Judicial salary issues should be insulated from the political process. Judicial pay levels should
be set regularly and justified based on accepted, easy to measure, objective benchmarks that render the
process more transparent and less political." David B. Rottman, et al., Natl. Ctr. for St. Cts., Judicial
Compensation in New York: A National Perspective 3 (2007) (available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
publications/pdfs/NCSCJudicialCompReport.pdf). The Center recommendation also included a commission to regularly review salaries, rather than the automatic increases recommended here. Id. The
commission approach seems unnecessarily complex for a smaller state like Montana.
40. Williams, supra n. 4, at 286; see also Charles G. Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate
and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1259, 1264-1265 (2008).
41. Geyh, supra n. 40, at 1264-1265.
42. See Edwin H. Stern, Frustrationsof an IntermediateAppellate Judge (and the Benefits of Being
One in New Jersey), 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 971, 986-987 (2008) ("Intermediate appellate courts exist so
that courts of last resort need not be burdened with the volume of cases and continued application of
established law while states maintain the right to appeal. They also exist to advance the evolution of law
based on their experience with the volume of cases."); James D. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate
Appellate Court, 41 Brook. L. Rev. 459, 462 (1975).
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thoughtful consideration of the most important legal issues. 43 Second, by
increasing the judicial resources devoted to appeals of right, intermediate
appellate courts promise to speed resolution of initial appeals. Finallymirroring the claimed benefit of the "percolation" of issues among the federal circuit courts of appeal prior to the consideration of the issues by the
United States Supreme Court-intermediate courts might enhance the quality of the state supreme court's decisions by giving the Court the benefit of
considering multiple appellate opinions addressing the issue.
The costs of such courts are the increased costs of operating an additional layer of courts, the increased legal fees incurred by litigants in seeking and participating in a second layer of appeals, and the uncertainty that
results from conflicting intermediate court opinions (where such differences
exist by virtue of divisions in the intermediate court) prior to the state supreme court's resolution of issues4a
Problems can be exacerbated by foolish structures. For example, in
Texas, appellate jurisdiction is divided in the first and fourteenth districts
(centered in Houston) between two intermediate courts, with cases from the
same geographical area randomly assigned between the two courts. 4 5 As
one commentator noted, this produces the absurd situation in which none of
the residents, lawyers, and trial judges in an area with a population of more
than two million people "can safely predict the state of the law in any matter" before a higher court rules on it.46 Problems can also be exacerbated
by the state supreme court's failure to address conflicting intermediate court
43. Having an intermediate court is no guarantee of thoughtfulness, however. See Porter & Tarr,
supra n. 1, at 150-151 (criticizing the Ohio Supreme Court for an "approach to cases, which generally
has not been conducive to thoughtful policy development. Even when dealing with complex legal issues, the court has the reputation of substituting speed for thoroughness of consideration.").
44. See David J. Schenck, Are We Finally Ready to Reshape Texas Appellate Courts for the 21st
Century?, 41 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 221, 225-226 (2009) (describing the "simple arithmetic of conflicts" in
Texas's intermediate courts of appeals).
45. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 22.202(h) (2004).
46. Schenck, supra n. 44, at 227. As another lawyer put it, this is "practicing law on a guess and a
gamble." Scott Brister, Is It Time to Reform Our Courts of Appeal?, 40 Houston Lawyer 22, 26 (April
2003). See also Andrew T. Solomon, A Simple Prescriptionfor Texas's Ailing Court System: Stronger
Stare Decisis, 37 St. Mary's L.J. 417, 418-419 (2006) (describing car crash in Houston in which one
victim was able to sue the city for negligence and one was not, because the cases were assigned to
different courts of appeal); Montes v. City of Houston, No. 14-99-00174-CV, 2000 WL 1228618, slip
op. at 1,4 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2000) and supp. op. on reh'g, 2000 WL 1562355, slip op. at 1 (Tex. App.
Oct. 19, 2000) (barring the passenger from suing), pet. denied, 66 S.W.3d 267, 267 (Tex. 2001), Reyes v.
City of Houston, 4 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Tex. App. 1999), pet. denied, (allowing the passengers to sue).
Even more entertaining is the case of Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. 1995), in which
one party perfected an appeal two months before the final judgment was signed and so prevailed in the
race to determine which court of appeals would hear the case. Id. at 139. The history of the overlapping
jurisdiction of Texas appellate courts (which extends beyond the two in Houston noted above) is described in James T. Wirthen, The Organizational& StructuralDevelopment of Intermediate Appellate
Courts in Texas, 1892-2003, 46 S. Tex. L. Rev. 33, 63-66 (2004).
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opinions in a timely way, something Texas lawyers have complained about
47
for some time.
Because Montana has a relatively small population and its courts have
a relatively small caseload, the burden-shifting role of an intermediate appellate court is less necessary in Montana than in a more populous state.
The first state intermediate appellate court with full-time judges was established in Ohio in 1883,48 when the State's population was just over 3 million. 49 With just a third of that population today, Montana's caseload may
not justify an intermediate court. The Montana Supreme Court also provides comparatively speedy resolution of cases, reducing the benefits to litigants of an additional layer of appellate review. Moreover, the Montana
Supreme Court's opinions show no sign that the Court's deliberations suffer
from an overwhelming workload. It seems unlikely the benefits of increased decision quality that might flow from an intermediate court would
be worth the increased costs. Thus, the only reason to add an additional
layer of review would be if Montanans wished the Supreme Court to take
on an even greater policy-making role than it already occupies.
D. Specialized Courts
Oklahoma and Texas have divided their final courts of appeal into two
bodies, one handling criminal matters and the other handling civil matters.
In both states, the lower appellate and (at least some) trial courts are not
bifurcated in this manner. Alabama and Tennessee have different intermediate courts for criminal and civil matters. Many states have specialized
trial-level courts, ranging from district courts that hear only criminal cases
to "drug courts" and domestic-violence courts that focus on particular types
of offenses. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals
only in limited areas, giving it some specialization (in patent appeals, for
example) and some breadth (since it also hears other appeals). Specialized
courts have also been proposed for other areas, including "science"
courts.

50

Advocates of specialized courts generally focus on the benefits of appointing judges with greater expertise and technical sophistication, as well
47. See e.g. Brister, supra n. 46, at 23-24 (noting the Texas Supreme Court "rarely" resolves conflicts, doing so "literally once in a blue moon," possibly due to "mulish aversion" to them).
48. Daniel J. Meador, Maurice Rosenberg, & Paul D. Carrington, Appellate Courts: Structures,
Functions, Processes, and Personnel 366 (Michie Co. 1994).
49. Ohio History C., Ohio's Population, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/qf-population.php (last
accessed Sept. 27, 2010).
50. See e.g. Andrew W. Jurs, Science Court: Past Proposals,Current Considerations,and a Suggested Structure, 15 Va. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2010).

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

as on the overall benefit of increasing capacity for additional cases. 51 In
some instances, concentrating particular types of cases in a court is thought
to provide better perspective on the scope of the problem (e.g. domestic
violence courts). The risk associated with specialization is that the narrow
jurisdictions attract greater investment by special interests seeking to influence the selection of the judges; it is more cost-effective than for a court of
more general jurisdiction.5 2 In addition, operating additional courts costs
states more financially.
Montanans would have three choices to make about specialized courts
in a constitutional convention or other proposed revision of the Judiciary
Article. First, they could use the Constitution to mandate certain specialty
courts (e.g. a separate set of family or probate courts). Second, they could
use the Constitution to exclude certain types of specialty courts (e.g. requiring one supreme court rather than allowing the bifurcated models of Texas
and Oklahoma). Third, they could leave these issues to future legislatures.
Given the small size of Montana's population and the likelihood that the
benefits of any specialization would vary over time, leaving the matter to
the Legislature would be a reasonable choice.
E. InstitutionalizingAlternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")
Through the groundbreaking Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act ("WDEA"), Montana's Legislature encouraged parties to employment
disputes to engage in ADR rather than litigation.5 3 My survey of the
WDEA's impact, based on court files now several years out of date, did not
54
find evidence that these incentives were working to any significant extent.
Should Montanans wish to encourage greater use of ADR in civil cases,
stronger incentives must be built into the legal system. One option is to
provide a constitutional sanction for ADR. Another is to ensure that any
language concerning "open courts" in a new Constitution does not pose a
51. The standard explanation for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is that it was created to
reduce the backlog in the Texas courts. See Solomon, supra n. 46, at 436. When I was practicing in
Texas in the mid-to-late 1980s, a more common explanation among attorneys I knew was that it ensured
that "tough on crime" former prosecutors could be put in charge of criminal matters, leaving the plaintiff
and defense bars to contest control of the Texas Supreme Court without disrupting criminal law jurisprudence. When a constitutional reform proposed merging it into the Texas Supreme Court and unifying
the two courts of last resort in the 1970s, however, opposition reportedly came from criminal defense
lawyers. See Joe R. Greenhill, The Constitutional Amendment Giving Criminal Jurisdiction to the
Texas Courts of Civil Appeals and Recognizing the Inherent Power Of The Texas Supreme Court, 33
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 377, 388 (2002).
52. See generally Morriss, Comment: A Public Choice Perspective on the Federal Circuit, supra n.

24, at 816.
53. See Morriss, The Story of the WDEA, supra n. 22.
54. Id.

2011

REFORMING MONTANA'S JUDICIAL ARTICLE

problem for legislation mandating ADR resolution or providing incentives
for parties to choose ADR.
II.

SELECTION

Even well-designed court systems will not function efficiently unless
they are overseen by competent judges. The criteria and method used to
select judges is thus crucial to the success of judicial institutions.
A.

Choosing Judges

The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Commission on the 21st
Century Judiciary characterized improving judicial selection as "among the
most contentious subjects that the Commission has been directed to address."'55 There is an extensive literature on the topic. 56 Because opinions
on the subject are so strong, this is likely to be a controversial issue at any
future constitutional convention or in the context of other means of amendment.
It is important to separate consideration of selection methods from
opinions about particular individuals serving as judges. Bad selection
methods may produce excellent officeholders on occasion. The Territorial
Judiciary was an abysmally designed institution in general, but Montana
was fortunate to have Decius Wade serve as its Territorial Chief Justice
from 1871 to 1887; he was one of the best judges to serve on any territorial
court. 57 Conversely, even well-designed selection methods are likely to
produce problematic results from time to time. New York, for example,
uses a form of the merit-selection process, yet found itself with a chief
judge in the grips of mental illness, stalking a woman with whom he had
had an affair and illegally using massive quantities of prescription drugs
(more than 5,000 pills over 18 months), even as he won praise for the quality of his judicial opinions. 58 Thus, choosing well-designed selection methods does not guarantee good choices will be made; it merely makes them
more likely. Moreover, as Charles Geyh noted, "which of the various sys55. ABA, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary app. A at
13 (2003).
56. An excellent starting place for any potential convention delegate would be the bibliography
compiled for a 2005 Mercer Law School symposium: Suzanne L. Cassidy, Judicial Selection: A Select
Bibliography, 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1019 (2005).
57. See Morriss, Legal Argument in the Opinions of Montana Territorial Chief Justice Decius S.
Wade, supra n. 22.
58. See John M. Caher, King of the Mountain: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler (Prometheus Bks. 1998); Linda Wolfe, Double Life: The Shattering Affair between Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler and Socialite Joy Silverman (1st ed., Pocket Bks. 1994); Sol Wachtler, After the
Madness: A Judge's Own Prison Memoir (N.Y.: Random H. 1997).
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tems for judicial selection is 'best' depends upon what one is looking for."'59
And even defining "merit" in judicial selection turns out to be surprisingly
60
hard.
American jurisdictions have experimented with a variety of judicial
selection methods, ranging from selection by the legislature for short terms,
to election in partisan and non-partisan elections, to selection by merit commissions, complete with protected tenure. Although elite, legal opinion currently favors merit-selection processes (which, perhaps coincidentally, put
substantial control of judicial selection in the hands of elites), election was
the dominant means of selection chosen by states beginning in the midnineteenth century. 6 1 Longer terms are also currently in favor because they
provide greater independence for the judiciary. 6 2 The primary arguments
against judicial elections rest on the claims that selecting good judges requires legal expertise which voters lack 63 and that the electoral process undermines judicial impartiality by forcing candidates to raise money from
lawyers or campaign in ways that some think may undermine judges' independence. 64
The form of selection may not be that important in some senses.
Kermit Hall's research suggests that all forms of American judicial selection produce judges who look very similar in demographic and other background terms. 65 However, many states selected their judges via elections
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century because people believed that these
elections rooted the judiciary in democratic legitimacy. New states frequently had bad experiences with their appointed territorial judiciary, and
perhaps elections seemed democratic. 66 Legal elites turned against elec59. Geyh, supra n. 40, at 1278. The most innovative and intriguing proposal I have seen is a
student's proposal for election by lot among members of the state bar: William Bunting, Student Author,
Election-by-Lot as a Judicial Selection Mechanism, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 166 (2006). The author
makes a surprisingly compelling case that using a lottery among lawyers would resolve many of the
problems with both appointive and elective systems.
60. Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection by the Numbers, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1197 (2005).
61. See Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Death of Democratic Accountability: The
PopularElection of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 9 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 345 (1984).
62. Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary
in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 190 (1993).
63. See e.g. Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 43, 55 (2003).
64. See e.g. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 1, 2006) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/Oljudges.html). The paper
found that Ohio Supreme Court justices rarely disqualified themselves from cases in which the parties
had made contributions to their campaigns. On average, the justices ruled in favor of the contributors 70
percent of the time. One justice favored his contributors 91 percent of the time. Id.
65. See Henry Glick & Craig Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics:The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 Judicature 228, 231-235 (Dec. 1986-Jan.1987).
66. See Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in
the Private Provision of Law, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 581, 618 n. 193 (1998) (quoting commentator
who stated: "While it would be considerably too much to say that Nevadans wanted statehood just to
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tions by the early-twentieth century and began promoting selection by ap67
pointment.
Elections are a problematic way to select judges for several reasons.
First, the idea of electing an official by majority vote-one whose job
description includes protecting potentially unpopular individuals, interests,
68
and minorities against majorities-at least raises some difficult questions.
Second, electing judges in a state can bias judicial decisions against out-ofstate interests, even when the state simultaneously hopes to entice those
same interests into investing in the state. Former West Virginia Supreme
Court Justice Richard Neely illustrated this problem when he explained the
pressures to decide in favor of a local party against an out-of-state one:
I am a backwoods judge who decided ordinary cases that are of absolutely no
concern to anyone but the litigants. Most of my day is consumed by working
as the inside man at the judicial skunkworks where I slog through tedious
criminal, workers' compensation, and product liability cases. If I say to myself, "the hell with those Frenchmen at Michelin!" and give some injured
West Virginian a few hundred thousand dollars, it doesn't shatter the foundations of West Virginia's commercial world. Since I'm paid to choose besleeping well. Why
tween deciding for Michelin and sleeping well, I choose
69
hurt my friends when there is no percentage in it?

Partisan elections involve both considerable ballot drop-off, with fewer
votes in judicial elections than in up-ballot races for governor and other
offices, 70 and partisan voting, with high correlations between party votes
for governor and party votes for judges. 7 1 Moreover, the atmosphere has
changed since the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which applied the First Amendment to candidates in judicial
elections. 72 With the post-White trend favoring those challenging restricescape the territorial court, certainly after (statehood) the fierce excitement of the mining suits greatly
abated.").
67. G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 605, 608-609 (2009).
68. See Stephen P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law,
62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689 (1995).
69. Richard Neely, The Product Liability Mess 6-7 (Free Press 1987). A particularly good critique
of judicial elections on rule-of-law grounds, drawing on the international development literature is:
Norman L. Greene, Perspectivesfrom the Rule of Law and International Economic Development: Are
there Lessonsfor the Reform of JudicialSelection in the United States?, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 53 (2008),
which I would include on the reading list of convention delegates.
70. Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, & Anthony Salvanto, How Voting is like Taking an SAT
Test: An Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 Am. Pol. Q. 234 (2000).
71. Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Accountability
65-100 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1980) (concluding that many voters base their votes on party identification).
72. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
prohibit judicial candidates from disclosing political views); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier,
ExplainingJudicialDiversity: The DifferentialAbility of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State
Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 St. Pol. & Policy Q. 329, 345 (Winter 2003).
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tions on partisan speech by judicial candidates, elections may become more
problematic.
As Charles Geyh has argued at length, the net impact of the trend toward more heavily contested, partisan elections for judicial positions reflects a shift toward using elections as a means of promoting political accountability rather than their original purpose of promoting judicial independence from the executive and legislative branches. 73 If the goal is to
allow voters to reject judges who have made unpopular decisions, partisan
elections serve that purpose:
The critical question is whether this is the kind of accountability that we want
judicial elections to promote. If, as [Prof. Melinda Graham] Hall and a significant segment of the political science community believe, independent judges
are essentially unconstrained policymakers who decide cases by acting on
their personal "preferences" or "attitudes," then the answer would seem to be
yes, because elections will produce "public policies that better represent the
citizenry" by "creating incentives for judges to pay attention to citizen preferences when deciding highly visible and publicly salient issues."
If, on the other hand, as the mainstream legal community believes, independent judges do their best to follow "the law," flexibly defined ... then the
answer is presumably no, because elections create incentives for judges to set
the law to one side and "pay attention to citizen preferences" when deciding
cases.

74

Despite the criticisms of judicial elections, the scholarly consensus disfavoring judicial elections, and the critiques of judicial elections filling
American law reviews, most states have shown little interest in eliminating
judicial elections. 75 Both the strong attachment to judicial elections, even
as many voters ignore judicial races, and surveys that report dislike for judicial campaigning suggest that moving away from elections should be a step
taken only after a great deal of deliberation.
Merit-selection systems pose their own challenges, including the crucial question of how the commission should be selected. 76 And we do want
some form of accountability to the public's views. A story related by former New York Mayor Ed Koch about a judge who was mugged captures
the importance of accountability:
A judge I helped elect was mugged recently. And do you know what he did?
He called a press conference and said: 'This mugging of me will no way
73. Supra nn. 28-29 and accompanying text.
74. Geyh, supra n. 40, at 1272 (internal citations omitted).
75. See Geyh, supra n. 63, at 57 (noting that even many reformers have "accepted elections as a
permanent part of the judicial selection landscape, reformers are now embarking on new programs of
incremental change").
76. For an excellent survey of merit-selection issues, see Stephen Zeidman, Careful What You Wish
For: Tough Questions, HonestAnswers, and Innovative Approaches to Appointive JudicialSelection, 34
Fordham Urb. L.J. 473 (2007).
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affect my decisions in matters of this kind." And an elderly
lady got up in the
77
back of the room and said: "Then mug him again."

What makes Koch's anecdote ring true is that judges ought to reflect something of their community's values, including the value it puts on preventing
and punishing crime. What makes the anecdote troubling is that we do not
want judges to reflect too much of the community's values, since we want
them to stand up for counter-majoritarian assertions of rights. Unfortunately, no method of judicial selection guarantees getting the balance right
by ensuring the judges are "mugged" just the right number of times.
B.

Qualification Requirements

There is considerable discussion about the requisite qualifications for
judicial office, particularly in the context of United States Supreme Court
nominations. While my own research makes me skeptical about the impact
of most demographic and background variables,7 8 the issue is largely irrelevant to an electoral system because voters are allowed to decide whether a
particular candidate is qualified. Adding constitutional restrictions only
reduces voter choice by limiting the pool of potential candidates.
Two areas are worthy of discussion, particularly if Montana opts for a
method other than election to select judges. First, it may be desirable to
require some level of legal experience to adequately equip a judge to interpret contracts and statutes, understand the rules of evidence, and so forth.
Of course, merely being licensed for a period of time is no guarantee of
ability, but requiring a minimum level of experience is a reasonable screening device. Second, requiring some specific Montana legal experience may
also be desirable. To the extent Montanans desire a uniquely Montanan
legal culture, requiring a minimum amount of legal experience in Montana
would ensure that judges have been exposed to the local norms and practices. This factor is quite important; both a reputation in the legal community and exposure to local norms have the potential to affect how a judge
rules. Of course, both lack of experience generally and, more specifically, a
lack of long-term residency could be raised as an issue in an election campaign. Thus, including such restrictions in the Constitution may not be necessary.
Ell.

CONSTRAINTS

Because judges have extraordinary powers, a major concern is how to
ensure those powers are exercised in appropriate ways. For example, state
77. Charles Henning, The Wit and Wisdom of Politics 107 (Fulcrum Pub. 1989) (quoting Ed Koch).
78. See Sisk, Heise, & Morriss, Charting the Influences on the JudicialMind, supra n. 24.
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courts led the 1960s revolution in tort law by abolishing traditional defenses
and dramatically changing how doctrines like negligence are applied. 7 9
How might a Constitution provide guidance to state courts?
Two sets of constraints might be considered for the Montana Constitution. First, a state constitution can provide greater or lesser degrees of guidance on how courts are to exercise their constitutionally granted powers.
Several decades of battles in state courts over how to interpret vague education-finance language or open-courts provisions provide examples of the
difficulties that can arise when constitutions err on the side of vagueness.
For instance, the Montana Supreme Court's sharply divided 4-3 decision in
Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc. 80 over the constitutionality of the WDEA
arose from the lack of clear constitutional language in the "full legal redress" clause of the state Constitution. 81 At the same time, though, overspecificity is also problematic since it can lead to a lengthy and confusing
state constitution. Alabama's Constitution is an extreme example of how
over-specificity can be problematic; the Constitution is approximately
220,000 words in length, more than twice the length of the next-longest
state constitution. 82 Should Montana hold a constitutional convention in the
future or pursue reforms in another forum, one way to avoid such problems
is to carefully review all provisions, not just the Judiciary Article, with an
eye toward clarifying pleasing-but-vague phrasing that might sow the seeds
of future conflicts, while also emphasizing brevity. Of course, it is far easier to recommend such a course of action than to actually strike the balance.
Second, a state constitution may provide guidance on how courts
should interpret its clauses. Montana courts have taken quite different approaches to interpreting the current state Constitution at different times.
For example, on October 20, 1999, the Montana Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality83 that relied heavily on the records of the 1972 Constitutional Convention to interpret Article II, § 3 and Article IX, § 1 of the
state Constitution. Six days later, the court issued an opinion in Armstrong
v. State of Montana8 4 interpreting Article II, § 10 with barely a mention of
the Convention debates.

79. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation
34-40 (Yale Univ. Press 1988).
80. Meech v. Hillhaven W. Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
81. Mont. Const. art. II, § 16.
82. The PARCA Report, The Alabama Constitution and the November Ballot, http://parca.samford.
edu/PARCA2/reports/rpt27.pdf (last accessed Nov. 7, 2010).
83. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
84. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
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This difference is problematic because the circumstances of the adop85
tion of Article II, § 10 did not support the Court's decision in Armstrong.
The closeness in time of the two decisions highlights the inconsistency in
methodology, but the problem is more general. A consistent framework for
when the drafters' intent should control outcomes would make the law more
predictable and courts less susceptible to charges that they are result-oriented. A future constitution could address this issue outside the context of
specific cases and hot-button issues like abortion and economic development by providing guidance to the courts on how to interpret the constitution and the extent to which they should look to the convention's records as
guidance.
Judges are not the only ones who need to be constrained, however.
Legislatures and the executive branch also need to be constrained from interfering with judicial power. Although the record of state courts asserting
their independence from interference is mixed at best, 86 language providing
the courts with guarantees of independence is also important. Once again,
however, striking the right balance is likely to prove tricky.

IV.

REMOVAL

If selecting judges is controversial, removing them is even more so.
The federal government and many states rely on impeachment processes so
cumbersome that imprisoned judges continue to hold their appointments for
months even after their convictions become final, drawing their salaries
while serving their sentences because the legislature cannot expeditiously
remove them. 87 These are not new complaints. In 1965, a bar report recommended that "impeachment should be supplemented by effective machinery for the investigation of complaints against judges and for the removal of those found unfit or guilty of misconduct in office." 88 Some
states have allowed recall of sitting judges (seven did so in the early twenti85. The Convention occurred prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, at a time
when abortion was illegal in Montana, weakening a link between the state Constitution's provision of
privacy rights and abortion. That the Convention's discussion of the constitutional language did not
include discussion of abortion further suggests the delegates did not believe the language covered abortion. Of course, the Montana Supreme Court might have been using an interpretative strategy that did
not depend on the drafters' intent. Its heavy reliance on drafters' intent in MEIC suggests some explanation of when intent matters would be useful in predicting future outcomes.
86. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 S. Ct. Rev. 357,
360-368 (2000).
87. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 431, 459 (2004) ("Impeachment
is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of bad judges, however. Legislators usually do not want to
get involved in the impeachment matters, which are distracting and offer few political payoffs."). Miller
offers an impressive catalog of the ways judges can be "bad." Id. at 433-455.
88. Report of the Twenty-Seventh American Assembly, The Courts, the Public, and the Law Explosion, 49 J. Am. Judicature Socy. 16, 18 (1965-1966).
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eth century); 89 others provide means for the electorate to remove judges
through contested or retention elections. For example, California voters removed former Chief Justice Rose Bird and two associate justices in 1986
after a contentious campaign that focused on death-penalty issues but was
in fact funded by business interests. 90
Judicial elections serve as one check on judges, making removal by the
electorate possible at regular intervals. However, elections are not sufficient, as the case of former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Don Yarbrough illustrates. An unknown lawyer with a name similar to former Senator Ralph Yarborough and former gubernatorial candidate Donald Yarborough, Don Yarbrough was elected Chief Justice in 1976. 9 1 Only a few
months later, he resigned under threat of impeachment. 92
The main innovation in judicial removal was the shift to retention elections within a merit-selection system, an innovation introduced to "quiet the
fears of the devotees of the elective method. ' '93 Intended as part of a reform
aimed at depoliticizing the judiciary, retention elections today are not obviously superior to other forms of judicial election (partisan or nonpartisan) in
accomplishing that goal. 94 Interviews with judges suggest that concern
over retention elections affects decision making. As Professor Taff notes,
Uncertainty about the likelihood of an electoral challenge may affect judicial
decision-making as well, because judges may seek to avoid decisions that will
bring the wrath of interest groups down on them. The prospect of an election
in which a single decision can be taken out of context and used to attack a
judge may have a chilling effect on judicial independence. In a series of
interviews conducted with judges who ran in retention elections from
89. Tarr, supra note 67, at 607.
90. See Erwin Chemerinsky, EvaluatingJudicial Candidates, 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1985, 1986-1987
(1988). Recently, judicial removal has sparked controversy in Gibraltar and the Cayman Islands, with
the latter currently in the Privy Council in a case of first impression. See Francis Gibb, Privy Council
Majority Backs Removal of Gibraltar'sChief Justice, London Sun. Times (Nov. 13, 2009) (available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6915979.ece); Judge Misbehaved Says Report, Cayman
News Service (June 1, 2010) (available at http://www.caymannewsservice.com/headline-news/ 2010/06/
01/judge-misbehaved-says-report). The ongoing debates these cases represent suggest that there is no
consensus about the proper method of deciding whether or not to remove a particular judge nor, as the
Gibraltar and Cayman cases suggest, about what constitutes inappropriate behavior by a judge in many
circumstances.
91. Paul Burka, Heads, We Win, Tails, You Lose, Tex. Mthly. 138, 139 (May 1987); J. Caleb
Rackley, A Survey of Sea-Change on the Supreme Court of Texas and Its Turbulent Toll on Texas Tort
Law, 48 S.Tex. L. Rev. 733, 756-759 (discussing Yarbrough's election). Yarbrough soon fled the
jurisdiction, taking up residence on Grenada to study medicine. He was eventually arrested while attending a class in St. Vincent. See Herbert Wexler, Law is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Different Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 423, 456
(2007).
92. Id.
93. Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its HistoricalDevelopment, in Selected Readings: Judicial Selection and Tenure 29 (Glenn R. Winters ed., rev. ed. 1973).
94. Tarr, supra n. 67, at 612-613.
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1986-1990, fifteen percent indicated that, as the election approached, they
sought to avoid controversial cases and rulings, while another five percent
indicated that they became more conservative in sentencing in criminal cases.
Even judges who try to avoid being influenced by the prospect of a reelection
campaign acknowledge that it may subconsciously influence their judgments.
Thus, describing a judge's predicament in deciding controversial cases while
facing reelection, former California Justice Otto Kaus suggested that "[i]t was
like finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but it's hard to
95
think about much else while you're shaving."

Recent reform proposals suggest longer terms and other restrictions on retention elections. 96 Tarr concludes: "Taken altogether, these proposals testify to a growing realization that retention elections cannot prevent the
politicization of judicial selection absent supplemental reforms designed to
address the politicization of judicial elections generally, not just the
'97
politicization of retention elections.
These concerns are not shared by members of the public at large. As
evidenced by both public-opinion polls and the rejection of reform initiatives aiming to replace elections, the public continues to believe in the importance of a means of removal through elections. 98 If Montanans decided
to depart from selecting judges by popular election, then establishing a
method of expeditiously removing bad judges would be particularly important to preserving the quality of the judiciary. Although Montana currently
enjoys a skilled judiciary, selecting a mechanism for removal should nonetheless be a priority so the State has the tools to address the problem in the
future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The question for any future constitutional amendment is the extent to
which it might improve on what the State has now with respect to the judiciary (indeed, with respect to the Constitution as a whole). The answer, as
usual when you ask a law professor, is "it depends." It depends on all sorts
of things that a voter trying to make up her mind on whether or not to call a
constitutional convention cannot know. Yes, we can surely imagine a "better" judiciary article, if only we could agree what "better" means. There are
95. Id. at 614-615 (internal citations omitted).
96. Report of the Citizens for Independent Courts Task Force on the Distinction between Intimidation and Legitimate Criticism of Judges, Uncertain Justice: Politics and America's Courts, http:Ilwww.
ncbp.org/ Handouts-2-07/Opening%20Plenary7.pdf, 90-94 (2000) (last accessed Nov. 7, 2010) (longer
terms); Tarr, supra n. 67, at 615-616 (summarizing other suggestions to restrict elections); Geyh, supra
n. 40, at 1278 (summarizing list of proposed reforms, including longer terms).
97. Tarr, supra n. 67, at 616.
98. Id. at 617 (summarizing polls and rejected initiatives).
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surely better ways to elect and remove judges, better ways to pay them,
better ways to organize them, better ways to protect their independence, and
better ways to keep them from stepping outside whatever bounds are set.
There is no shortage of suggestions on how to do all of these things better.
But there are worse ways of doing all of these things as well. Improving on
what Montana has already will be harder than it looks.

